Penciling in a gesture toward providence, determinism, and liberty

What follows is embarrassing in its lack of precision. Let's call it what it is: sloppy. As a matter of fact, it is so bad that I've edited it four times since the original publish. So come back and check it later and it will probably (hopefully) be better. Nevertheless, William Hasker's little survey of metaphysics keeps me blurting out what I think about his subjects. And today, his subject is the impassible way between determinism and libertarianism. (Libertarianism here is not to be confused with the quasi-economic position assumed by many of the Rand-loving, conservative, twenty-something males that I know. It is, rather, a technical term for what is popularly called free will.)

A Reformed Protestant, I begin every thought in this area with a confession of God's providence, for "he himself is before all things, and in him all things hold together (συνεστηκεν)" so that "he sustains (φερων) all things by his powerful word" (Col 1.17; Heb 1.3b NRSV). "The will of God," said Augustine, "is the necessity of all things." Not only, but the first, stated pattern of my theological pattern language is simply, God leads out.[1] But this beginning throws me and similar theists into a certain bind. I like the way Hasker sums it up:

It is quite clear that the doctrine of predestination entails determinism: specifically, theological determinism. God has effectively determined everything that shall happen, and no creature has the power to act otherwise than God has decreed. It is clear, furthermore, that the theological determinist, at least if he is a Christian, must be a soft determinist, for the view that humans are responsible for their actions is central to Christian belief. Thus one has the very difficult problem . . . of explaining how a person is responsible for his actions when he was unable to act otherwise. And there is the additional problem of explaining how God himself is not responsible for human wrongdoing, even though it is God's decrees which necessitate that the wrongdoing occurs. (51)

So the Christian may confess providence, which is a scripture-affirming thing to do, yet providence creates fundamental ethical problems on the human and divine sides. This is why the free will question is unavoidable even if it tires you--as it does me. If humans do not have free will, can they be held responsible for wrongdoing? Is there meaning to human action? Should we trust or value or include as evidence the experience we all have of decision making? Is there a way to avoid Calvin's abhorrent second predestination of the wicked to destruction which, it can and has been argued, makes God unjust, the author of evil, and responsible for the suffering of innocents?[6]

I am not going to discuss the divine side of the equation, but I am going to talk about the rest.[5] Taking up the first question: I believe that people do act with a kind of qualified freedom (a soft libertarianism.) We are embedded (thrown) into layer upon layer of historical and cultural context, and these deeply shape who we are as actors (see the card "Every Action a Reaction.") Because all human beings are made in the image of God, they can freely act within the bounds of nature, and those actions are meaningful--even moral actions--in their context (though compromised). By God's grace, the imago can be restored, which gives greater agency to human beings. Jesus's freedom is, in renewed humanity, proleptically restored, now and now-yet. The regenerate, therefore, begin a struggle for freedom illuminated by God's eschatological promise in Christ to the church. I expect this struggle will continue as long as people do. Human beings, no matter how free, will only ever reflect the freedom of God.

Going back to the conflict between determinism and libertarianism, I think the frame of reference makes a big difference in understanding. If one is looking out of human eyes, actions are messy but still, in a way, free. But if one imagines oneself into a divine state, determined providence seems only natural. The thing is, human beings think about things from both angles, theory and praxis, the vertical and the horizontal, theology proper and ethics. We cannot eliminate one. We must, instead, choose which we will emphasize.

To the problem of settling these two perspectives, God's timelessness comes to the rescue (though it too, Hasker says, is qualified and disputed).[2] Because God is timeless, tensed words like now, tomorrow, yesterday, or talk of the future or past do not apply. As Hasker says, God "believes things timelessly, entirely out side our time sequence . . . And what it is that God timelessly believes depends, in part, on what I will freely choose to do tomorrow morning." (55) God's timelessness allows for human free action. And it tells us that providence must effect itself in a manner much different than the two-dimensional before-then-after of Aristotelian sufficient causation. Something like what I'm getting at I find in this bit from Reformed theologian Paul Helm:

"In creating, God does not add to his reality. The creation does not distend God’s boundaries, for he has no bounds. So thinking of God as if has he has boundaries would be inconceivable. The contrast between God’s ways and ours is not one of degree, but one of kind. For this reason the decree of God may be considered as the eternal aspect of his mind."

To summarize: I take my cue from physics which, at present, talks out of both sides of its mouth. It affirms Einstein's standard model, and it affirms the quantum. The two are irreconcilable. Nevertheless, we affirm them and use them properly depending on our need. Using the analogy, I think the human mind is incapable of reconciling determinism and libertarian free will. But the nature of thought makes one favor one or the other. I favor determinism. I'm a determinist that simultaneously affirms a qualified or soft libertarian free will. The latter is made possible because God is timeless. His tenselessness creates a horizon in which tense can exist.[3] Yes, I shamelessly use two different grammars according to whether the subject is theology proper or ethics. So the Spirit regenerates AND people should repent and believe.[4]

But perhaps some one will say, If all that the Father gives, and whomsoever He shall draw, comes unto You, if none can come unto You except it be given him from above, then those to whom the Father gives not are free from any blame or charges. These are mere words and pretenses. For we require our own deliberate choice also, because whether we will be taught is a matter of choice, and also whether we will believe. (John Chrysostom.Homily 45 on the Gospel of John, Jn. 6.37)

There is another way, of course: the way of the process theologians and the panentheists. Going that way, God limits himself, opening up a space of some kind (logical or spiritual or metaphysical or metaphorical) from which his divine power is removed. That process they call creation, and in it, evil and choice have their temporary arena.

And, finally, meandering to an end, allow me to say this about discussions of providence and free will or, if you like, determinism and libertarianism. A friend today asked me whether this wasn't majoring on the minors. I don't think he knows how much I dislike the whole of it myself. I would much rather talk about other aspects of dogma. Nevertheless, I said to him that though there is no ultimate resolution to these questions in our present state, they have persisted and will persist as long as thinking and confessing persist. And joining in that argument means laboring alongside some of the best minds humanity has ever produced. It is a labor they found valuable because it connects so many other portions of real thinking and living. And shouldn't we, with the life and the minds given to us, be part of this human work? I would look askance at someone who beginning at the door of thought did not eventually arrive at this chamber. And I would doubt the abilities of anyone who found a way to move further in without discomfort at the choice they had to make. Either choice means pain and ongoing discomfort and shouldering the unreasonableness of reason.

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[1] "God leads out" does not suggest the lure-theory of the process theologians but a kind of strong pull where the future and the God of the future providentially pull all things to their appointed end. Another way of saying this is that the doctrine of creation is not a static doctrine but an ongoing one. The creation is not yet in the state to which its creator desired it. It is advancing toward that state according to his providence and promises.

[2] Scientific discussion of the non-locality of quantum entanglement suggests that time is not part of the infrastructure of reality but is its result. The engine of reality must work outside of space-time. And the non-locality/non-temporality of quantum events, then, means that there is no need to wait for any cause to produce any state.

[3] It occurred to me at some point that I was thinking of providence as either (a) an organizing force of matter or events in space-time or (b) as a soteriological act whereby God saves sinners. What I haven't considered is that providence provides a horizon of meaning. Because of providence, truth, justice, and beauty have a horizon from which they derive significance. Tracing the philosophy, here: Charles Taylor has usefully distinguished between self-referentiality of content and manner. Self-referentiality of content sees nothing in discourse except the self and its desires. Self-referentiality of manner recognizes a horizon against which the self finds significance. (Ethics of Authenticity [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991], 81-82.) In Michael Polanyi's terms, the self-referential is subsidiary to the focus of education: the pursuit of justice and truth. (Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962], 55-57). // this copied from Hasker pp 490-491n64.

[4] It is of vital importance to remember Luther's warning that a peek at God's determinism is not supposed to give the Christian a window into guessing at reality. Instead, it is meant to provide comfort to the believer that God is well able to do what he has promised to do. Luther strongly urged those interested in this "arrived doctrine" to run from the metaphysical temptation. Providence, he said, falls under soteriology and needs to stay there. Consider, in the spirit of this idea, the following:

"When its content is not specifically defined in relationship to the incarnation of the Jewish human being Jesus of Nazareth, the doctrine of providence becomes vulnerable to ideological colonization. Reflection on providence, therefore, must proceed in light of the fact that there is only ever one divine Subject of the doctrine: the particular God revealed in the covenant with Israel and the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Providence is not primarily about abstract concepts like omnipotence, sovereignty, or causality, but about how the God who brought Israel out of slavery in Egypt, became a Jewish human being, and was crucified and resurrected continues to be in an active relationship to creation. Contemporary reflection on the doctrine of providence begins by affirming that God never acts otherwise than God has acted in Israel and Jesus. Theological accounts of providence must fix their vision on the concrete particularity of Jesus Christ. (Matt R. Jantzen,God, Race, and History: Liberating Providence (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2021), pp. 145–146)

[5] I am going to copy this insight that someone named Nick Prendes-Brizuela wrote on a theology forum regarding Molinism and middle knowledge.

My main contention with Molinism and mere Molinism is the foundation of the theological belief that God's knowledge of counterfactuals (the Would Be's of reality) stem from God's middle knowledge. It seems to me that God knows all the counterfactuals based in his natural and free knowledge rather than this invention of middle knowledge in the 16th century. In other words, I believe that God's knowledge of counterfactuals stems from his intimate knowledge of his creation and what they would do in any given circumstance. Middle knowledge by definition states that God's knowledge of counterfactuals isn't due to his intimate knowledge of his creation, but instead middle knowledge states that God knows the counterfactuals of his creation based upon their possible actions prior to God's decision to create. I do not believe that middle knowledge is required for God to know all counterfactuals."

Middle knowledge is independent of the divine will. That is absurd because how can something be or do apart from the divine will? Arminius doesn't answer how free will etc can exist, and neither does Molinus.

[6] Arminians say yes and argue for an understanding of God's eternal exhaustive foreknowledge as the only alternative that leaves genuine human freedom, called libertarian freedom, intact.